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STATE TAXATION
Michael R. Klein*
As might be expected, matters relating to collection of ad
valorem taxes comprised the major body of appellate literature
in this area during the Symposium period.
1
In Standard Homes, Inc. v. Prestridge,
the court sustained
the standing of a mortgage creditor (who had already acquired
title in foreclosure proceedings) to prosecute a suit to annul an
allegedly invalid tax sale.2 Suit was brought within the fiveyear peremption period for annulments, although after the threeyear period for a right of redemption had expired. 8 The tax
purchaser unsuccessfully urged a distinction between the rights
of a mortgagee under these two remedial provisions, relying
upon several statutes, including La. R.S. 47:2183. 4 Unconvinced
of the urged thrust of these provisions the court reached its conclusion, in part, pursuant to the following reasoning of the lower
court:
"A purchaser at tax sale is similar to one who takes a

pledge or pawn or is a secured endorser. His purchase is
actually for the benefit of the tax debtor. His rights are
strictly limited. The delinquent tax sale is used only for the
purpose of tax collection and is not devised to divest ownership or to effect gain for bargain buyers or advantage seekers. It is intended to protect ownership of property while at
the same time it insures tax collection. The tax purchaser is
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 193 So.2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). Another decision dealing with
the notice requirement in terms of the right to redeem or annul was Finley
v. Abbitt, 190 So.2d 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
2. Insufficient notice to the mortgage-owner was the basis successfully
urged for invalidity. In rejecting the adequacy of the attempts to actually
notify the absent owner the court repeated "the rule that where the tax
collector after the tax delinquency notice is sent to the wrong address, was
returned unclaimed, and made no further efforts to ascertain the tax debtor's
correct address and deliver the notice, the tax sale was void and purchaser's
tax title invalid: Act No. 170 of 1898, §§ 50-52, LSA-R.S. 47:2179, 47:2180;
Act No. 106 of 1934, LSA-R.S. 47:2228; Const. 1921, art. 10, § 11; Miller v. Cormier, 16 So.2d 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943); Robinson v. Mafrige, 229 La. 376,
86 So.2d 72 (1956)."
3. LA.

CONST. art.

X,

§ 11.

4. Providing that upon the expiration of the three-year redemption
period, recordation of the tax sale deed "in the conveyance or mortgage
office shall operate as a cancellation of all conventional and judicial mortgages." Also urged were the provisions of LA. R.S. 9:5201 and 47:2105 (1950).
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not a favored creature of the law. The contrary is apparent
from our jurisprudence, i.e., the tax debtor is protected. The
assignees and others of interest through the tax debtor stand
in this same favor.
"Certainly the statute which gives rise to the right to set
aside an invalid tax sale during a period of five years has an
overriding significance and takes precedence over a statute
which cancels all mortgages and liens after the three year
period of redemption. The cancellation of mortgages and
liens after the passing of the three year redemptive period
is predicated upon the validity of the sale. If the sale is
invalid and if in fact, a right exists for the owner to set
aside said sale as null and void, redemption is not applicable
and the cancellation period would not operate.
"The suit which is involved herein questions the validity
of the tax sale. This court has a right to pass upon that question and once that question is decided, the defendant cannot
complain that the party to whom the property should revert,
is not a party to the suit. As one in interest, the defendant,
even though not record owner, had there been no executory
proceeding, could set aside this sale and return it into the
name of the record owner. He could then bring an executory
proceeding and could foreclose. The fact that he has proceeded with executory process prior to the setting aside of
the tax sale does not affect his rights under the law. . .. "5
In another case dealing with tax sales the Fourth Circuit
concluded that a contractual acquisition of property by the City
of New Orleans did not operate so as to extinguish a matured
tax lien upon the property. Applying that principle the court
sustained the validity of a deed acquired by a purchaser of the
tax lien which matured prior to the city's acquisition. In doing
so the court rejected the applicability of article 2217 of the Civil
Code? delineating extinguishment of obligation by unity of
5. Standard Homes, Inc. v. Prestridge, 193 So.2d 100, 103 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1966).
6. Ducote v. City of New Orleans, 193 So.2d 349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
7. "When the qualities of debtor and creditor are united in the same
person, there arises a confusion of right, which extinguishes the obligation."
(Emphasis added.)
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debtor and creditor, primarily upon the ground that the in rem
nature of the tax obligation precluded the application of the
8
apparent in personam thrust of the code provision.
Finally, in Glidden v. Loe9 the Second Circuit construed the
statutory prohibition against the issuance of process designed
to "restrain the collection of an ad valorem tax""' in such fashion
as to allow issuance of an injunction to restrain a sheriff's
seizure and sale of property owned by one party for purposes
of satisfying ad valorem tax delinquency owed by another.
No discussion of the ad valorem tax area would be complete
without reference to the continuing controversy relating to
equalization of assessments. Unless the assessors or legislators
act promptly and frankly to remedy the present abuses, it is
this writer's opinion that judicially imposed upheaval equivalent
to reapportionment confronts Louisiana. Such a development,
clearly not in the best interests of the state, must be appreciated
and avoided if at all possible.
Modern technology apparently deprived the state of revenues in Collector of Revenue v. LouisianaReady Mix Company.1
This observation flows from the First Circuit's conclusion that
new models of concrete mixing trucks are exempt from the
power use tax since the engines in such trucks are "primarily
used" to propel the vehicles rather than the mixing device. It
should be noted, however, that the court limited its ruling to the
newly developed "power take off" systems, to be distinguished
from the older truck systems in which the mixers are turned
by means of separate engines.
In perhaps the most significant tax decision during the
period of this Symposium the Louisiana Supreme Court appears
to have effectively construed away most of the constitutional
provisions 12 regarding prescription of tax claims. The decision,
18
in Collector of Revenue v. Pioneer Bank and Trust Company,
14
was reached after evaluation of a number of Civil Code, stat8. The identity of the city with the state was the contended personam
rationale, to wit, the city [state] was the owner of the tax then as well as

of the property.
9. 192 So.2d 633 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
10. LA. R.S. 47:2110 (1950).
11. 197 So.2d 141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).

12. LA. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 16, 19.
13. 250 La. 446, 196 So.2d 270 (1967).

14. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3518, 3519, 3547 (1870).
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utory,15 and constitutional provisions. 16 In view of the farreaching import of the decision, a rather full exposition seems
warranted.
The case presented to the court arose out of the collector's
effort to collect back income taxes through distraint of the delinquent's bank account. The taxes which formed the basis of
the claim were originally unpaid state income taxes for the year
1945. In June of 1949, the collector assessed the taxpayer for the
unpaid 1945 taxes, plus interest to June of 1949, whereupon the
taxpayer protested and appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals.
The Board, in February of 1950, rendered its decision affirming
the assessment, which decision was not thereafter appealed by
the taxpayer.
Notwithstanding this activity and conclusion, the taxpayer
never paid the assessed amount. Subsequent efforts by the collector to locate assets owned by the taxpayer in Louisiana, as
well as suits filed (but not culminating in judgments) outside
Louisiana led to naught. Finally, during 1965, twenty years after
the year for which the taxes were due, and fifteen years after
the disposition by the Board of Tax Appeals, the state located
assets of the taxpayer on deposit with a Louisiana bank. The
collector moved to distrain the account, but was opposed by the
bank, which conflict produced the law suit under examination.
The thrust of the bank's opposition was the constitutional
assurance in article 19, section 19, of the Louisiana Constitution
"that all taxes and licenses, other than real property taxes shall
prescribe in three years from the 31st day of December in the
year in which such taxes or licenses are due." Absent other considerations, this provision would seem to have prescribed the
state's tax claim on December 31, 1949. The state, however, successfully urged that the assessing of a deficiency was such a
consideration. In fact, the state urged that the "assessing" interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
While the court had little difficulty in assenting to this
proposition, it had more difficulty in determining the quality of
the interruption. 7 These matters aside, however, the ultimate
15. LA. R.S. 47:1580-1581 (1950).
16. LA. CONST. art. XIX,

§§

16, 19.

17. The conclusion ultimately reached was that the filing of the assessment permanently interrupted the tolling of the prescriptive period on tax
claims.
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conclusion reached turned more on statutory than code provisions. In point, the court was principally concerned with sections 47:1580 and 47:1581 of the Revised Statutes.
Section 47:1580 provides that the course of the three-year
prescription is interrupted, inter alia, by "(1) the collector's
action in assessing any such amounts in the manner provided by
law.""' Section 47:1581 builds upon that foundation, declaring,
in effect, that assessments rendered by the collector are to be
considered "the equivalent of a judgment [and] shall not be
subject to the running of any prescription other than such prescription as would run against a judgment in favor of the State
of Louisiana." Which is to say-as article 19, section 19, of the
Louisiana Constitution provides-it shall not run at all. Thus
the 1945 taxes were rendered collectible in 1965, despite the
three-year prescriptive period!
One is troubled by the opinion. Serious questions of constitutional dimension are raised. The issue is defining the limits,
if any, to the capacity of a legislature to emasculate constitutional guarantees by statutory redefinition of the crucial verbiage.
To state the problem in its extreme-one might suppose that
the assurance of a jury trial in a criminal case could not be
emasculated by a statute redefining "criminal cases" as including
only those involving capital offenses. Still further problems are
presented with regard to the "assessment" which the statutes
equate with "judgments." For unless this statutory provision is
limited beyond the dimensions indicated by the opinion or by
other statutes, the entire thrust of article 19's prescriptive provisions are rendered next to meaningless. Further clarification
of both these problem areas is awaited.
18. Sections 47:1561 et seq. of the Louisiana revised statutes delineate

the power and duty of the Collector to assess taxes. Essentially, the duty
there imposed extends to unpaid or "back" taxes other than ad valorem
taxes. The manner in which the law directs him to make such assessments
is upon an "audit, investigation or examination" to make a determination
"by estimate or otherwise" of taxes due plus any penalties or interest due.
The assessment is thereupon mailed to the delinquent, who is thereby also

informed of his rights to protest and proceed to oppose the finality of the
assessment.

